REGULATION OF OFFSHORE INVESTMENT
COMPANIES THROUGH
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF RULE 10b-5
The managerial and financial structure of investment companies
provides strong incentives for internal corporate manipulation. Although investment company shareholders receive most rights associated with corporate ownership,1 the typical shareholder is financially
unable to purchase an influential interest. 2 The large size of investment
companies and the middle-income clients to whom they cater encourage corporate control by a small group of investors.3 The controlling shareholders of an investment company influence the company's
decisions regarding investment of its highly liquid assets, possibly
favoring their own interests and ignoring the interests of noncontrolling
shareholders. 4 In recognition of these potential abuses, Congress enacted the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA)5 and the Investment
I. For an example of the rights granted to shareholders of an investment company, see the
explanatory memorandum concerning a fictional, Luxembourg investment company's offer of
shares in PRACTICING LAW INsTITUTE, INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND OFFSHORE INVESTMENT
FUNDS 109-39 (1969).
2. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ABUSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN THE ORoANIZATION AND OPERATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. Doc.

No. 279, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1940) [hereinafter cited as SEC ABUSES REPORT].
3. For a thorough description of the structure of an offshore investment company, see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, H.R. Doc. No. 64, pt.
3, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY]. See also
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE ORIGIN, SCOPE, AND CONDUCT OF THE STUDY,
NATURE, AND CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, AND THE

ORIGIN OF THE INVESTMENT TRUST AND INVESTMENT COMPANY MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 707,75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT COMPANY REPORT].

4. Commenting on the period after the stock market collapse in 1929, the SEC noted that
[investment company] insiders often sold unmarketable securities... to their investment companies or caused these companies to take over dubious and illiquid investments in which they were interested; compelled these organizations to assume large and
onerous commitments on which these insiders were obligated, such as participations in
underwritings, trading accounts, loans, and other commitments; required these companies to relieve them of existing liabilities and obligations to their investment companies;
caused these organizations to finance clients of these insiders and companies in which
they were interested, and induced the making of direct loans to insiders, often without
any collateral or upon inadequate security. These various transactions were permeated
with conflicting interests, and many were characterized by the absence of arm's-length
dealing and by opportunities for overreaching.
SEC ABusES REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976).
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Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA).6 Both Acts require disclosure of specific
financial data 7 and restrict activities of persons affiliated with investment companies."
Since the enactment of the ICA and the IAA, several foreign investment companies have been created to avoid both United States tax
and securities regulations 9 and the restraints of the ICA and the IAA.
The ICA and the IAA regulate only those companies that register
under the Acts or use instrumentalities of interstate commerce to sell
securities. 10 Because neither the ICA nor the IAA regulate "offshore"
investment companies, claims against those companies require extraterritorial application of other federal securities laws.
In 11T v. Cornfeld" the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
extended rule lOb-51 2 extraterritorially to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction in an action brought by foreign shareholders of a foreign investment company against its foreign investment advisers. The court's
decision impermissibly extends federal securities laws because it permits regulation of the internal affairs of offshore investment companies
in a manner similar to regulation of domestic investment companies
under the ICA and the IAA.
This note analyzes the Second Circuit's use of rule lOb-5 to regulate the internal affairs of offshore investment companies. The
Cornfeld decision represents the intersection of two trends in interpretation of federal securities regulation: first, the shift from a strictly disclosure-based application of rule lOb-5 to a broader corporate
mismanagement-fiduciary duty interpretation; 13 and second, the development of the "conduct" and "effects" tests for extraterritorial application of federal securities laws. 14 This note discusses the development of
6. Id. §§ 80b-i to -21.
7. For example, investment companies that register under the ICA must file a statement that

discloses the extent to which the company intends to borrow money, issue senior securities, underwrite securities, concentrate investment in specific industries, purchase and sell real estate or com,

modities, make loans to other persons, and turn over its portfolio. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(l) (1976).
8. The ICA prohibits any person affiliated with an investment company from selling securities to that company or from participating jointly with the company in any transaction with other
persons. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (d) (1976). See notes 54-62 infr; and accompanying text.
9. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 3, at 885.

10. See 15 U.S.C.

§§ 80a-7, 80b-4, -6 (1976).

11. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) (promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)).
13. Compare Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) with Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
14. See generally IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respect to holdingon merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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both trends and analyzes the Second Circuit's use of these concepts to
support jurisdiction, focusing on the effect of such use on the ICA and
the IAA.
I. lIT v CORNFELD: INTERNAL MISMANAGEMENT OF OFFSHORE
INVESTMENT COMPANIES

The liquidators of IIT, an international investment trust organized
under Luxembourg law, brought a derivative action in the United
States against the company's investment adviser, IIT Management
Company, alleging several lOb-5 violations. IIT was operated like an
open-ended mutual fund: 15 foreign investors purchased redeemable
shares of the IIT "fund," and the fund's assets were managed and controlled by IIT Management, a Luxembourg corporation controlled by
Investors Overseas Services, Ltd. (IOS). Both IOS and IIT Management were operated from Geneva and controlled by Bernard Cornfeld
16
and, later, by Robert Vesco.
15. Judge Friendly accepted this characterization of 1IT's operation in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1003 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975). In an "open-ended" mutual fund, the fundholders have an
unlimited right to have the investment company redeem their shares at any time. See generally
INVESTMENT COMPANY REPORT, supra note 3. Luxembourg law prohibits an investment com-

pany from purchasing its own shares. Thus, to operate as an open-ended investment company,
the company must establish a second company to repurchase independently shares redeemed by
investors. The investment company lends to the repurchasing company the funds required for the
repurchases. To repay the loans, the repurchasing company resells the shares it purchases. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 3, at 917. IIT differed from domestic open-ended companies in that it had no directors. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 913 n.4.
16. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., created by Bernard Comfeld, was an offshore investment service that allowed Europeans to invest in American securities, which the Europeans believed were less risky than others, but to avoid United States regulation and taxation. During its
heyday in early 1970, IOS employed almost 20,000 people to serve customers in over 125 countries. At that time, the IOS complex included 17 mutual funds, 20 fund management companies,
12 banks and financial companies, 10 real estate companies, and 50 other subsidiaries. It had
assets of over $2 billion. See Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: PossibleSolutions to a Regulatory
Dilemma, 3 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 157, 158 n.7 (1971). Of IOS's $2 billion assets, IIT held

$345 million, of which 40 percent was American securities. In 1971, after the value of IOS's assets
dropped by $1billion, IOS cut its staff by one-half, and Cornfeld sold all of his interest in the IOS
enterprise. American financier Robert Vesco eventually took control. The large losses and consequential reduction in the market value of IOS shares caused massive redemptions of those shares.
The SECs charge in 1972 that Vesco was looting IOS funds hastened the IOS's decline. As a
result of the subsequent scandal, Luxembourg placed all investment funds, including IIT, under
the control of the Bank Control Commissioner. One year later, the Luxembourg district court
approved the Commissioner's petition for a declaration of IITs bankruptcy and appointed liquidators, the plaintiffs in IIT v. Cornfeld. 619 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1980). The collapse of IOS and
its subsidiaries created numerous lawsuits. See, e.g., Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1009 (1978); King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976);
In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975);
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974);
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The complaint alleged that IOS,IIT Management, and a group of
American corporations controlled by John King conspired to defraud
IIT. Allegedly, IOS and IIT Management, in exchange for kickbacks,
inflated management fees, and the opportunity to participate in Kingsponsored tax avoidance schemes, agreed to induce IIT to purchase securities from the King complex. King's companies required "continu17
ous injections of vast sums of money to survive."
IIT acquired the King securities in three transactions. First, IIT
acquired subordinated debentures having a face value of $8 million
from King Resources Capital Corporation (KRCC). IIT later sold
these debentures at a loss of almost $9 million.' 8 Second, IIT
purchased 200,000 shares of King Resources Company (KRC) stock
for $16.8 million. IIT later lost $14 million in selling the stock. Finally, IIT purchased a $12 million convertible note from The Colorado
Corporation (TCC). The note was never paid because TCC, along
with the other companies of the King complex, declared bankruptcy.
Because of stays issued in bankruptcy, KRC, TCC, and KRCC were
not named defendants in the action.' 9 For the losses allegedly suffered,
IIT requested $35 million in compensatory damages and $35 million in
punitive damages.
The threshold issue in the case was whether American courts have
subject-matter jurisdiction over a foreign investment adviser's scheme
to defraud a foreign investment company. 20 Because the ICA and the
IAA do not apply to foreign investment companies, 2 ' jurisdiction was
available only through extraterritorial application of anti-fraud regulations. 22 Without subject-matter jurisdiction, the case would have been
dismissed, and IIT would have been required to bring its action in Luxembourg, where personal jurisdiction over several American "aider
23
and abettor" defendants could not have been obtained.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 24 Rather than
Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y.), a9d men., 614 F.2d
1286 (2d Cir. 1979); lIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rep'd, 619 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1980); Venture Fund v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
17. 619 F.2d at 915.
18. Id. at 914.

19. See id. John King was convicted in a criminal action for his activities regarding "Fund of
Funds," another IOS-controlled investment fund that speculated in shares of other investment
companies. See United States v. King, 560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977).
20. 619 F.2d at 912-13.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See, eg., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, -8, 80b-6 (1976).
E.g., Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
See 619 F.2d at 917 & n.10.
Id. at 932.
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viewing the transaction as entirely foreign, the Second Circuit emphasized the domestic activities of the nondefendant King companies and
held that those activities provided a sufficient basis for subject-matter
jurisdiction.25 The court refused to view IIT Management's activities
as a breach of fiduciary duty to IIT and instead stated that the activities
were relevant only to avoid imputing IIT Management's knowledge of
the fraudulent activities to IIT.2 6 Using this rationale, the court linked
IIT Management with the King complex's United States activities, asserted subject-matter jurisdiction based on those activities, exposed IIT
Management to lOb-5 liability for its activities, which essentially involved breach of fiduciary duty, and circumvented the jurisdictional
restrictions imposed by the ICA and the IAA27-Acts applicable to
28
similar activities by domestic investment companies and advisers.
The Second Circuit's rationale allows regulation of the internal
management of foreign investment companies. This regulation has
several negative repercussions. First, foreign investment advisers that
breach their fiduciary duty to their clients are subject to lOb-5 liability
so long as the breach involves an American corporation engaging in
significant domestic conduct.29 Rather than bring a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty in the foreign country, foreign shareholders
may bring the action in the United States by claiming that the investment adviser violated rule lOb-5 and by emphasizing the domestic activities of the American corporation. Shareholders in countries whose
securities laws are less strict than those of the United States will prefer
to bring the action in the United States. Thus, Cornfeld increases the
jurisdictional scope of United States securities laws at the expense of
foreign laws that are arguably more applicable to the foreign
transaction.
Second, Cornfeld's rationale ignores the jurisdictional limitations
in the ICA and the LAA. Although IIT Management's activities were
the specific types of activities proscribed in those Acts, the Acts do not
provide a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction because they apply only
to domestic investment companies or to domestic activities of investment advisers. 30 By classifying a foreign investment adviser's activities
as conspiracy with a third-party American company to defraud the investment company, the foreign shareholders may bring suit under rule
25. Id. at 917-18.
26. Id.
27. See statutory sections cited at note 21 supra.

28. See notes 57-74 infra and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the "conduct" test for subject-matter jurisdiction, see text accompanyig notes 128-30 infra.
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-7, -8, 80b-6 (1976).
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1Ob-5, avoid the jurisdictional limitations of the ICA and the IAA, and
obtain relief similar to that provided by those Acts. Thus, the Cornfeld
decision allows United States courts to exceed the express jurisdictional
limits of the ICA and the IAA and regulate the internal affairs of offshore investment companies to a degree never before achieved.
II.

STATUTORY REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES:

THE

INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND THE INVESTMENT

ADVISERS ACT
A. Legislative Purpose.
The ICA and the IAA are the last of a series of securities regulations enacted in response to the 1929 collapse of the nation's financial
markets. 3' After an exhaustive SEC study revealed widespread and
uncontrolled abuses in the investment company industry, 32 Congress
and representatives of the investment-company and investment-advisers industries worked jointly to enact the ICA and the IAA.
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, recommending
passage of the ICA, pointed out several abuses to be remedied by the
legislation. 33 First, the highly liquid, highly mobile, and easily negotiable assets of investment companies were attractive to "unscrupulous
managements" that used the assets for personal profit to the detriment
of the companies' shareholders. 34 Second, investment companies were
created with minimal capital and could be controlled by persons previously convicted for securities fraud.35 Finally, the potential for selfdealing through unloading worthless securities, causing unfair
purchases, obtaining unsecured loans, and making affiliated transactions presented opportunities for widespread abuse. 36 Congress intended the ICA to remedy these abuses, as well as several others noted
in section one of the Act, 37 through detailed regulation of the internal
structure and management of investment companies.
Judicial interpretation of the legislative history of the ICA emphasizes the close internal regulation that Congress intended. In Brown v.
31. Prior to passage of the ICA and the IAA, Congress enacted both the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
32. The list of abuses included self-dealing transactions, misrepresentations to shareholders,

transactions with affiliated companies, improper and fraudulent accounting practices, and general
internal mismanagement of investment companies. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6
.(1940). For a compilation of the reports containing the SEC study, see id. 5.
33. Id. 6.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b) (1976).
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Bullock 38 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
noted the contrast between the detailed internal controls of the ICA
and the very narrow disclosure and registration policies of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In Burks
v. Lasker39 the Supreme Court concluded that the primary function of
the ICA is to "impose controls and restrictions on the internal manage'40
ment of investment companies.
Congress enacted the IAA as a corollary to the ICA in recognition
of the influential and potentially abusive role investment advisers play
in the management and control of investment companies. The Senate
report accompanying the bill 4 ' specified two groups protected by the
Act: unsophisticated investors subject to unscrupulous investment-adviser activities42 and bona fide investment counselors stigmatized by
such activities. 43 The committee also identified the important "personalized relationship" that exists between the investment adviser and the
client as a consideration in enforcing the IAA. 44 Therefore, Congress
intended the IAA not only to regulate investment-adviser activities affecting interstate commerce, national securities exchanges, the national
banking system, and the United States economy, 45 but also to regulate
and preserve the fiduciary relationship between investment advisers
and their clients.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized Congress's intent
to provide fiduciary standards for investment advisers. The Court thoroughly analyzed the legislative history of the IAA in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau46 and concluded that
[t]he Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ... reflects a congressional
recognition "of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship," as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at
least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investor unconsciously-to render advice which
ment adviser--consciously
47
was not disinterested.
The Supreme Court reconfirmed its recognition of the IAA's emphasis
38. 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
39. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
40. Id. at 478 (quoting United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 705 n.13

(1975)).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940).
Id. 21.
Id.
Id. 22.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-I (1976).

46. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
47. Id. at 191-92 (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d
ed. 1961)).
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on fiduciary duty in TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 48
concluding that the IAA establishes "federal fiduciary standards" to
49
govern the conduct of investment advisers.
Viewed together, the legislative histories of the ICA and the IAA
reveal a two-pronged congressional attack on investment company
abuse: first, by controlling the structural and managerial aspects of investment companies, the ICA prevents situations conducive to abuse;
and second, by creating federal fiduciary standards, the IAA provides
strong incentives against abusive, fraudulent activities by investment
advisers.
The ICA and the IAA regulate the internal affairs of domestic investment companies to protect unsophisticated investors and to preserve the personal nature of the inherent fiduciary relationships
between investment companies and their advisers. Express statutory
sections exclude foreign investment companies and foreign investment
advisers from the scope of the Acts.50 Although investment companies
not regulated by the ICA cannot sell their own shares in the United
States, the Act does not prevent an offshore fund from purchasing securities of United States corporations for its own portfolio. 51 Thus,
Congress recognized that foreign, nonregistered investment companies
might be involved in transactions with United States corporations, but
expressly refused to subject those foreign corporations to ICA and IAA
regulation. Congress has continued to refuse to regulate offshore investment companies despite calls for territorial expansion of the federal
52
securities laws.
The Second Circuit, in lIT v. Cornfeld,53 achieved what Congress
refused to do. By characterizing IIT Management's actions as a failure
to disclose material facts and by ignoring the underlying breach of
fiduciary duty, the court circumvented the jurisdictional limitations of
the ICA and the IAA and allowed regulation of the internal affairs of
IIT, a foreign investment company, in a manner similar to ICA and
IAA regulation of domestic investment companies.
48. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
49. Id. at 17 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977)).

50. See note 21 supra. This statement assumes that the SEC does not grant special permission to register under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1976), and that the investment adviser is using no
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, see Id. § 80b-6.

51. See id. § 80a-7.
52. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, sufpra note 3; Note, OffshoreMutualFunds: Extra-

territorialApplicationofthe SecuritiesExchangeActof.1934, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1225
(1972).
53. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
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B. Application of the ICA and the IAA to IT v. Cornfeld.
The acts of fraud and self-dealing allegedly perpetrated by IT
Management represent the types of abuse Congress intended the ICA
and the IAA to regulate. IT Management's activities violated both
managerial-oriented sections of the ICA and fiduciary-oriented sections of the IAA.

IIT Management's participation with IIT in the King transactions
typifies the activity proscribed by section 17(d) of the ICA, which

makes "joint and several" participation by "affiliated persons" in transactions with the investment company an unlawful act.54 Investment
advisers, such as IIT Management, are included expressly in the defini-

tion of affiliated persons.55 Rule 17d-1, 5 6 promulgated pursuant to section 17(d), 57 requires the investment adviser to file an application with
the SEC for permission to engage in "joint enterprises. ' 58 Because affiliate participation can be not only joint but also joint and several,
investment company knowledge of the affiliate's joint activities is not
required.: 9 IIT Management's activities are analogous to those in
UnitedStates v. Deutsch,60 in which an investment adviser violated sec-

tion 17(d) and rule 17d-1 by influencing an investment company to
purchase promissory notes while the adviser received a fifty percent
54. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976).
55. See id. § 80a-2(a)(3)(E).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1981).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(a). Although part (a) uses the language 'Joint enterprise or other
joint arrangement or profit sharing plan" rather than "joint or joint and several" as used in section
17(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976), the regulation, in part (c), defines "joint enterprise or other
joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan" as an enterprise or undertaking in which an investment
company and an affiliate of the investment company have a 'Joint or a joint and several" participation, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(c) (1981), and therefore is consistent with section 17(d).
59. See 2 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 526 (1978) ("If affiliates
use dealings of the investment company over which they have influence to obtain secret benefits,
the affiliates are joint participants with the investment company"). See also United States v.
Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972) (an officer of a registered
investment company who made a secret agreement to purchase notes and to receive compensation
for a sale of similar notes to an affiliated investment company at a higher price violated section
17(e)); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (an affiliate of a registered
investment company who received secret compensation for participating in the takeover of
another firm violated sections 17(d) and 17(e)); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 410 F.
Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (investment advisers, acting as underwriters of a separate offering,
violated section 17(d) when they caused affiliated investment companies to purchase securities at
inflated prices to unload the securities and to protect the advisers' underwriting status); Monheit v.
Carter, 376 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (affiliates of an investment company violated section 17(d) by causing the company's purchase of certificates of deposit (C.D.) to allow the advisers,
without the company's knowledge, to obtain loans and advances from the C.D. issuer).
60. 451 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
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discount on identical notes purchased for his personal portfolio. 61 IIT
Management similarly violated section 17(d) and rule 17d-1 by influIIT Management received
encing IIT to purchase King securities while
62
kickbacks and other benefits from King.
The receipt of kickbacks and other benefits also violated section
17(e).63 That section prohibits any affiliated person of an investment
company, "acting as a agent," from receiving any compensation "for
the purchase or sale of any property to or for the [investment company]." 64 The Deutsch court held that the fifty percent discount was
unlawful compensation under section 17(e); 65 similarly, the kickbacks
are the types of comand other benefits received by IIT Management
66
proscribes.
17(e)
section
that
pensation
Finally, IIT Management's activities represented a fraudulent type
of scheme unlawful under ICA section 17(j) and rule 17j-1. Rule 17j-1
makes it an unlawful practice for any affiliated person of a registered
investment company, in connection with a sale or purchase of a security held or to be acquired by the investment company, "to employ any
device, scheme or artifice to defraud such registered investment cornpany." 67 IIT Management, by inducing IIT to purchase securities that
IIT Management knew were highly speculative, defrauded IIT in a
scheme with the King complex-an act unlawful under ICA section
170) and rule 17j-1.
IAA section 206 requires an investment adviser to disclose fully
any pecuniary interest that he has in a client's transactions.6 8 IIT Management's receipt of kickbacks was a pecuniary interest that should
have been disclosed under the Act. The SEC has determined that such
pecuniary interests prevent an adviser from giving disinterested investment advice to its client. The SEC has stated that
[a]n investment adviser is a fiduciary. As such he is required by the
common law to serve the interest of his client with undivided loy61. Id. at 106.
62. See IT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1980).

63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1976).
64. The phrase "acting as agent," as used in § 80a-17(e)(1), has been given a broad definition

that includes all affiliated persons not acting in the capacity of a broker and thus includes IT
Management. See United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d at 111.
65. Id. at 107-15.

66. IT Management's receipt of kickbacks and benefits causes the violation whether or not
IT Management acts upon these payments. See id. at 109-11.

67. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-l(a)(l) (1981).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Parts one and two of this section provide that "[ilt shall be
unlawful for any investment adviser.

.

. (I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud

any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client."
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[A] breach of his duty may constitute a fraud within the
alty....
meaning of69clauses (1) and (2) of section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act.

In addition to violating parts one and two of section 206, failure to
disclose a pecuniary interest also violates part four, which makes it unlawful "to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is
70
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
Although IIT Management's activities exemplify the abusive,
fraudulent investment, adviser practices that both the ICA and the IAA
were created to prevent, the Acts do not apply to IIT Management.
ICA section 17 applies only to affiliates of registered investment companies. 71 IIT was not a registered company and could not register
without SEC permission because it was not "organized or otherwise
created under the laws of the United States or of a state." 72 Congress
intentionally excluded foreign companies because of potential jurisdic73
tional difficulties.
IAA section 206 applies only to those investment advisers, whether
registered or unregistered, who perpetrate their fraudulent acts through
the use of interstate commerce. 74 The extent to which IIT Management
or the King complex engaged in interstate commerce is unclear. Moreover, no court has discussed the degree of interstate commerce neces75
sary to support a cause of action under IAA section 206.
69. Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-40 (Jan. 5, 1945), reprintedin [1981] 5 FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 56,374. In addition, the SEC stated that
an investment adviser may not effect a transaction as principal with a client unless he
obtains the client's consent to the transaction after fully disclosing any adverse interest
he may have, together with any other information in his possession which the client
should possess in order to determine whether he should enter into the transaction.
Id., [1981] 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 56,375. The SEC added that all comments regarding an
investment adviser selling for his own account apply when the adviser acts as a broker for a third
party. Id., [1981] 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 56,377.
Note that, unlike rule lOb-5, section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6
(1976), requires the adviser to obtain his client's consent in addition to disclosing all material facts.
Rule lOb-5 requires only disclosure of all material facts. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1976).
71. Id. § 80a-17.
72. Id. § 80a-8(a). See note 73 infra.
73. The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency said that under section 7, "[f]oreign
investment companies may not register as investment companies... in the United States unless
the Commission finds that these foreign investment companies can be effectively subjected to the
same type of regulation as domestic investment companies .... " S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 13 (1940). The Commission is given the power to make this determination by 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-7(d) (1976). Only registered investment companies can buy and sell securities in the United
States. Id. § 80a-7(a).
74. Id. § 80b-6.
75. IIT's original complaint included an allegation that section 206 was violated, see IlIT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 914, but, because neither the district.court nor the circuit court discussed the
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Prior to Comfeld, no court had interpreted any domestic securities
regulations to subject a foreign corporation to the high degree of internal regulation advanced by the Second Circuit. An analysis of the
court's use of rule lOb-5 extraterritorially and in corporate mismanagement situations reveals that its use is inappropriate for regulation of
internal abuses of investment companies and, even if appropriate when
used to regulate internal affairs of offshore investment companies, improperly exceeds prior limits on the extraterritorial application of the
securities laws.
III.

STATUTORY REGULATION OF OFFSHORE INVESTMENT

COMPANIES: RULE

A.

lOb-5

The Relationsh#p Between Rule lOb-5 and AA Section 206
Disclosure vs. FiduciaryDuty.
The language of parts a and c of rule lOb-5 is very similar to that

used in parts one, two, and four of IAA section 206.76 Although such

similarity provides a basis for identical treatment of the statutes, 77 fun-.
damental differences in their supporting policies show that the statutes
should not be applied identically.
The SEC adopted rule lOb-5 pursuant to section 10(b) of the Sesection as a basis for jurisdiction, one must conclude that section 206 was insufficient support for
jurisdiction.
76. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
The pertinent parts of IAA section 206 provide:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(l), (2), (4) (1976).
77. See, eg., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 25 & n.1 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting).
(4)
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curities and Exchange Act of 1934.71 The limited legislative history of

79
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 provides no insight into their purpose.

In contrast, the legislative history of IAA section 206, though also lim-

ited, reveals a major purpose of that section: to create fiduciary standards for the investment adviser.8 0 Although courts have continuously

expanded interpretations of rule lOb-5's purpose, 81 they have consistently followed the congressional expression of intent that IAA section
206 should apply to the fiduciary relations between investment advisers
and their clients.8 2 Certain activities involving investment advisers and
their clients probably fall within the wide range of actions covered by

rule lOb-5, yet extraterritorial application of rule .10b-5 to regulate
fiduciary activities of investment advisers would be contrary to Con78. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
79. The only specific reference to section 10(b) is in a Senate report stating that the section
"was aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill
no useful function." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). The Supreme Court has
expressly noted the lack of legislative history on section 10(b): "Neither the intended scope of
§ 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are revealed explicitly in the
legislative history of the 1934 Act, which deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
Milton Friedman, one of the drafters of rule lOb-5, described the events leading to the rule's
creation and adoption:
It was one day in the year 1943, 1 believe. I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building
in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the
Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with Paul
Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston, 'and he has told
me about the president of some company in Boston who is going around buying up the
stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling
them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be
quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do
about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b)
and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there
was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it should
be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to
all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the
table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well,"
he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
...I never thought that ... later it would be the biggest thing that had ever happened.
Conferenceon Codpication of the FederalSecurities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
80. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21-22 (1940). See notes 41-49 supra and
accompanying text.
81. See, ag., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respect to holding on merits,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
82. See, ag., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (applying
IAA section 206); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (applying IAA
section 206).
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expressed in the IAA, to limit such regulation to domestic
gress's intent,
83
activities.
The basic purposes of rule 10b-5 are to protect marketplace integrity and to equalize market risk to investors by requiring full disclosure
of all information material to the purchase or sale of securities. 8 4 The
rule regulates the environment in which securities are bought and sold
by promoting equal access to material information for all investors. 85
Although IAA section 206 also requires full disclosure by investment
advisers, its purpose is not protection of marketplace integrity or equalization of investor risk; its purpose is to protect client expectations that
the investment adviser will fulfill its fiduciary duty in advising the client. 86 The Supreme Court has stated that section 206 "reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment
advisory relationship,' as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or
at least to expose, all conflicts of interest. 87T Therefore, although both
rule lOb-5 and section 206 are disclosure-oriented, the different purposes for which the disclosure is required reveal fundamental policy
differences underlying the laws.
Judicial application of rule lOb-5 and IAA section 206 has also
revealed their basic policy differences. In Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v.
Green8 8 the Supreme Court refused to extend the scope of rule 1Ob-5 to
include a mere breach of fiduciary duty that involved neither deception
nor manipulation. The Court feared that such an extension would
bring a wide variety of corporate conduct, which had typically been
regulated by the states as breach of fiduciary duty, within the scope of
rule 10b-5.8 9 The Court was reluctant to allow federal courts to override established state policies of corporate regulation for the purpose of
applying a uniform "federal fiduciary principle." 90
83. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.

84. "A major purpose of the [securities laws is] to 'protect the integrity of the marketplace in
which securities are traded.'" United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Tlhe Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace
that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.
The core of Rule lob-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be
subject to identical market risks.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
85. 401 F.2d at 848.
86. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
87. Id. at 191.
88. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
89. Id. at 478.
90. Id. at 479.
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In contrast, Congress deemed the fiduciary relationship between
investment advisers and their clients appropriate for national regulation. 91 The Supreme Court has consistently held that IAA section 206
creates "federal fiduciary standards" for investment advisers. 92 In addition, the Supreme Court recently refused to infer a private right of
action from IAA section 20693 although the existence of implied private
rights of action under rule lOb-5 is well established. 94 A possible, albeit
implicit, reason for the Court's refusal to infer a private right of action
major
may be reluctance to allow such actions under a statute imposing 95
controls on the internal, fiduciary affairs of investment advisers.
Rather than examining the policies underlying the disclosure requirements of rule lOb-5 and of IAA section 206, the Second Circuit in
Cornfeld assumed rule lOb-5 was applicable and ignored the basis of
IIT's complaint, IIT Management's breach of fiduciary duty. The action was based on IIT Management's failure to disclose its financial
interest in the King-complex transactions. Disclosure of such an interest does not fulfill rule lOb-5 policies of equal investor information or
increased market integrity but, by revealing a conflict of interest detrimental to the fiduciary relationship between IIT and IIT Management,
fulfills the policies underlying IAA section 206. By characterizing IIT
Management's activities as a rule lOb-5 violation, the Cornfeld court
ignored rule lOb-5's policy basis.
B. Rule 10b-5 and Fiduciary Duty: Goldberg v. Meridor.
1. Breach of FiduciaryDuty as a BasisforRule lOb-5Actions. To
use rule lb-5 in Cornfeld, the court applied a Second Circuit doctrine
that characterizes a breach of fiduciary duty as a material fact and that
makes failure to disclose this fact to a corporation's noninterested directors or investors a deceptive act violating rule lOb-5. 96 The Second
Circuit first considered a lOb-5 action involving breach of fiduciary
91. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I (1976).
92. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).

93. 444 U.S. at 24.
94. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).

95. Although the Court did not express this rationale as a basis for its holding, it prefaced its
discussion of the implied right of action with a review of the fiduciary nature of section 206. 444
U.S. at 17.
96. See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
Three other courts of appeals have adopted rationales similar to that of Goldberg. See Healey v.
Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1980); Kidwell v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273,
1291-92 (9th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236, 250 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434
U.S. 1066 (1978).
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duty in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,97 in which a parent corporation induced its subsidiary to sell 500,000 shares of treasury stock to the parent before it released information of a valuable oil discovery. 98 The

court held that exercise of "controlling influence" over a subsidiary is a
deceptive act under rule lOb-5. 99 The court also implicitly held that,
when all directors of a subsidiary are parties to the fraud, the knowledge of the directors is not imputed to the subsidiary.' 00
In 1977 the Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.

Green, 101 reversed a Second Circuit decision that allowed an action
under rule lob-5 for breach of fiduciary duty absent deceptive or manipulative acts. The Court held that Congress, by enacting section
10(b),I ° 2 did not intend to prohibit conduct not involving manipulation

or deception' 0 3 and that "manipulation" as a term of art does not include corporate mismanagement.'

°4

In addition, the Court expressed

reluctance to extend federal regulation to an area traditionally governed by state law. 0 5 The Green decision appeared to end the trend
toward application of rule lob-5 to actions involving a breach of fiduciary duty.
Three months after the Green decision, the Second Circuit, in
Goldberg v. Meridor,1°6 reconsidered the Schoenbaum "controlling in-

fluence" doctrine in light of Green. In Goldberg a parent corporation
caused one of its successful subsidiaries to assume the overvalued assets

and massive liabilities of a troubled subsidiary and issued four million
of the successful subsidiary's shares to the troubled subsidiary. The

result was a reduction of the successful subsidiary's assets for the benefit of the troubled subsidiary and the parent. 0 7 A shareholder of the
97. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respectto holdingon merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
98. The parent acquired the shares for $1.35 per share. After the oil discovery was disclosed,
the shares sold for as much as $18 per share. See 405 F.2d at 205 & n.l.
99. Id. at 219-20.
100. See id. at 220.
101. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
103. 430 U.S. at 472-74.
104. Id. at 476-77.
105. Id. at 477-78.
106. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). Green was decided on
March 23, 1977. Goldberg was argued on June 9, 1977. In an apparent attempt to avoid a dismissal under Green by claiming an element of deception, the plaintiff in Goldberg appealed from the
district court's refusal to allow him to amend his complaint with evidence of misleading press
releases. The circuit court granted leave to amend. 567 F.2d at 213.
107. Id. at 211. In Goldberg a shareholder of Universal Gas & Oil Company (UGO) brought a
derivative action against UGO's controlling parent, Maritimecor, and Maritimecor's parent, Maritime Fruit Carriers. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated rule lOb-5 by causing
UGO to enter into an agreement with Maritimecor in which UGO issued to Maritinxecor over
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successful subsidiary brought a derivative action in which he alleged
that, in light of two misleading press releases issued by the parent, the
actions of the parent and of the troubled subsidiary violated rule lOb5.108 The Second Circuit, concluding that the case was a Schoenbaum
breach of fiduciary duty situation, held that Green did not overrule
Schoenbaum and that
Schoenbaum ... can rest solidly on the now widely recognized
ground that there is deception of the corporation... when the cor-

poration is influenced by its controlling shareholder to engage in a
transaction adverse to the corporation's interests . . .and there is

nondisclosure or misleading disclosures as to the material facts of the

transaction.10 9

Although the directors of the successful subsidiary knew of the fraudulent activities, the court refused to impute the directors' knowledge to
this subsidiary, instead viewing the fraud as though "independent
stockholders were standing in the place of the defrauded corporate
10

entity."
The practical effects of Goldberg are to revive the Schoenbaumtype action for breach of fiduciary duty and to evade the Green limita-

tion on such actions by making the breach a material fact that, under
rule lOb-5, must be disclosed."'

Because "[tihose who breach their

fiduciary duties seldom disclose their intentions ahead of time,' 12
Goldberg brings almost all breaches of fiduciary duty, matters traditionally left to the states, within the scope of rule lOb-5. 113
2. The Effect of Goldberg on Investment Company Regulation.

By using the expanded scope of rule lOb-5 under Goldberg, courts can
four million shares of UGO stock and assumed all Maritimecor's liabilities (including a seven
million dollar debt owed to UGO) in exchange for all Maritimecor assets. Maritime Fruit and
Maritimecor allegedly overvalued the assets of Maritimecor to cause "the dissipation of the substantial assets of UGO for the benefit of. . .Maritimecor and Maritime Fruit." Id. After the
transaction, the defendant corporations issued two press releases that "held out an inviting picture" of future growth and success. Id. at 214 & n.4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 217.
110. Id. at 215-16. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211-14 (2d Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v.
Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968).
111. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
112. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d at 225 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
113. "[S]ave for those rare instances where the fiduciary denounces himself." Id. To avoid
conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Green, the Goldberg rationale may be applied only
when a state law cause of action exists for the nondisclosed action. Otherwise, Goldberg would
constitute the type of regulation of fiduciary duty rejected in Green. Compare Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) with Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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regulate the internal investment decisions of any investment company,
whether foreign or domestic, and ignore the anti-fraud provisions of
the ICA and the IAA. n 4 Because the duties of an investment adviser
focus primarily on the sale and purchase of securities for the investment company's portfolio, any questionable activities regarding those
duties, excluding theft or embezzlement of investment company funds,
can be addressed under rule lOb-5. For example, rather than determine whether a party to an investment company is "affiliated" ' 15 or is a
"joint and several"116 participant in the transaction, a court need only
determine that the party's interests were "material" to the transaction
and, thus, should have been disclosed.1 7 The court's focus shifts from
regulation of investment company mismanagement to protection of investors and securities markets. By expanding the scope of rule lOb-5 to
cover internal mismanagement of investment companies, the Second
Circuit has threatened the viability of the ICA and the ]AA, Acts specifically designed to regulate those internal abuses. Actions prohibited
by the ICA and the IAA probably always satisfy the lOb-5 materiality
test, because ICA and IAA regulation of those actions is, arguably, conclusive proof of materiality. Regulation of domestic investment companies through rule lOb-5 is harmless: the court merely arrives at a
similar result using a different statute. In contrast, regulation of the
internal affairs of foreign investment companies through extraterritorial application of rule lOb-5 remains within the substantive limits of
the ICA and IAA, but greatly exceeds the express jurisdictional limits
of those Acts." 8
114. See notes 54-74 supra and accompanying text.
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976). ICA section 17 prohibits "affiliated persons" of investment companies from engaging in various types of transactions with those investment companies.
Section 2(a)(3) of the ICA defines "affiliated person":

(3) "Affiliated person" of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly
owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 percentum or more of
whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held
with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other person; (D) any officer,
director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is
an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory
board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company
not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976).
116. ICA section 17(d) prohibits an affiliated person from participating with the investment
company, on a joint and several basis, in any transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976). For
examples of activities that would violate this section, see text accompanying notes 54-62 supra.
117. Information is "material" if there exists "a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
118. See notes 50-52 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
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C. ExtraterritorialApplication of Rule lOb-5.

As a basis for asserting subject-matter jurisdiction over matters occurring outside the United States, American courts often refer to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES.' 1 9 The Restatement provides for broad jurisdiction

that may be based either on conduct occurring within United States
territory, the "conduct" test,1 20 or on conduct occurring outside that

territory but having substantial effects within that territory, the "effects" test.121 Judicial interpretation of rule 1Ob-5 has led to extraterritorial application of the rule based on narrow versions of the

Restatement's effects and conduct tests.
The Second Circuit created the foundation for the effects test in

Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,12 2 in which it stated that "Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to
protect.

. .

the domestic securities market from the effects of improper

foreign transactions in American securities."1 23 This broad version of
the effects test, applicable to almost any foreign transaction related to
American investors or securities markets, was substantially limited in
two subsequent cases. In Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v.

Maxwell' 24 the Second Circuit, concluded that Congress did not intend

"to impose rules governing conduct throughout the world in every in-

stance where an American company bought or sold a security"1 25 and

119. See, eg., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965) provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside
the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
121. Section 18 of the RESTATEMENT provides:

A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule oflaw attaching legal consequences to conduct
that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably
developed legal systems.
122. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respect to holdingon merits, 405 F.2d 215 (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
123. 405 F.2d at 206.
124. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
125. Id. at 1334.
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26
implied that the effect of the foreign transaction must be substantial. 1
Later, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,127 the court further limited

the effects test by holding that the test applies only to acts causing direct injury to purchasers or sellers in whom the United States has an
interest. Therefore, courts obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over
transactions occurring outside the United States only if the transactions
have a substantial and direct effect on persons in whom the United
States has an interest.

The "conduct" test was first applied in Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 128 in which the court took subject-matter

jurisdiction over nondomestic, fraudulent2 acts induced by substantial
misrepresentations in the United States.'

9

The court interpreted the

conduct test broadly, finding misrepresentation in actions that were
preparatory to the crucial, fraudulent acts that occurred abroad. The
Second Circuit, in liT v. Vencap, Ltd.,130 later narrowed the test, requiring that fraudulent misrepresentations, not merely preparatory
acts, occur in the United States. Therefore, a court has subject-matter

jurisdiction under the conduct test if a nondomestic, fraudulent transaction is induced by substantial, fraudulent misrepresentations occurring in the United States.

The transactions at issue in liT v. Cornfeld do not satisfy the effects test.131 First, the transactions produced only generalized effects on
the American economy, allegedly making it difficult for American corporations to attract offshore investment funds132-effects similar to
those rejected in Bersch for lack of directness and substantiality. 133
126. See id. at 1334-35.
127. 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See note 130 infra.
128. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
129. Id. at 1337.
130. 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975). Vencap was decided concurrently with a similar
extraterritorial jurisdiction case, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), ceri.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In Bersch a large class of predominantly foreign investors sued to
recover losses resulting from the purchase of shares of Investors Overseas Services (10S), a Canadian corporation. The complaint alleged that IOS and several underwriter defendants (including
Drexel Firestone, an American banking house) issued a prospectus for the initial offering of IOS
stock that materially misrepresented the financial status of IOS. The prospectuses were distributed to foreign investors and the offering was restricted to areas not subject to United States
jurisdiction. Emphasizing the obvious lack of substantial activities in the United States, the court
refused to extend application of rule lOb-5 "to cases where the United States activities are merely
preparatory or take the form of culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to
those abroad." 519 F.2d at 987. Although the court's analysis implies an intentional shift away
from a test requiring substantial domestic misrepresentations to one requiring only substantial
domestic activities, that implication was negated in Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018.
131. 619 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1980).
132. Id.
133. See 519 F.2d at 987-88.
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Second, the transactions had only an indirect effect on American investors because the injured parties had no substantial connection with the
134
United States.
Even though the effects test was not met, the Cornfeld court held
that subject-matter jurisdiction existed under the conduct test. The
court faced a problem in applying the conduct test, because there were
no 1IT Management activities in the United States. The only domestic,
fraudulent activities were those of the King complex, persons not parties to the litigation. By applying Goldberg v. Meridor,135 the court*
transformed the case from one involving IT Management's breach of
fiduciary duty to one characterized as a conspiracy between IT Management and the King complex. 136 Although the former is not actionable under rule lOb-5,1 37 the later "conspiracy" formulation is
actionable under lOb-5. The court then linked UT Management to the
domestic activities of the King complex to establish the domestic conduct necessary for subject-matter jurisdiction. 138 The result was expo134. See note 147 infra.
135. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See notes 106-13 supra
and accompanying text.
136. 619 F.2d at 917-18.
137. Mere breach of fiduciary duty is an insufficient basis for lOb-5 liability. See Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
138. 619 F.2d at 917-18. The court had little difficulty establishing the requisite conduct for
subject-matter jurisdiction over the KRC stock purchase and the TCC note purchase (for a
description of the transactions, see text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra). Because the securities
were of American corporations and had been purchased in the United States by Lipper, IIT's
American broker, the court reasoned that federal antifraud regulations should apply to the transactions. 619 F.2d at 918-19. The court found subject-matter jurisdiction over the KRCC convertible-debenture transaction more difficult because the entire transaction had been consummated in
Europe. The defendants argued that the transaction fell within the dicta in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), that the federal
securities laws do not apply to losses from foreign sales of securities unless the losses are directly
caused by acts occurring within the United States. 519 F.2d at 919. The court distinguished
Bersch, concluding that the KRCC debentures were essentially the obligations of KRC and that
the acts performed in the United States were much more than mere preparatory acts. Id. at 91920. The court distinguished Bersch on three grounds. First, unlike Cornfeld, the Bersch transactions involved only foreign securities. Judge Friendly reasoned that although the KRCC debentures were sold in Europe, they were the financial obligations of a United States corporation
because they were guaranteed by an American corporation (KRC), were convertible into KRC
common stock, and were issued by a foreign subsidiary (KRCC) that had no operating assets and
that was created by its American parent (KRC) only to help foreign investors avoid paying United
States withholding tax on interest payments. Id. Second, Judge Friendly noted the'relatively
greater participation of an American investment house as the lead underwriter of the KRC debenture offering and as the co-lead underwriter of the eurodollar offering. Id. at 920. Finally, he
asserted that because the KRCC debentures were essentially obligations of an American corporation, the activities occurring in the United States were much more than the mere preparatory
activities in Bersch. He focused on the drafting, accounting work, and printing of the prospectus,
all performed in the United States, for both the domestic offering and the foreign offering, and
concluded that "[d]etermination whether American activities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners
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sure of an offshore investment company to regulatory control that not
only exceeded all prior extensions of the ICA and IAA, but also exceeded all prior extraterritorial extensions of rule lOb-5.
In all pre-Cornfeld cases applying rule lOb-5 extraterritorially
through the conduct test, the fraudulent misrepresentations occurred in
the United States. The activities in Cornfeld occurred outside the
United States and are thus distinguishable. For example, in Leasco1 39
representatives of a British company met with and made misrepresentations to Leasco in New York, 140 and in Venca 141 the director of a
Bahamian investment fund, by using corporate funds for personal matters, defrauded the fund from his New York office. 142 In contrast, the
conduct test was not satisfied in Bersch143 because the deceptive acts
occurred only. in foreign countries and "merely preparatory" acts occurred in the United States. 144
In Cornfeld the court misdirected its analysis of conduct, focusing
on the conduct of the King complex rather than on that of IIT Management. IIT Management's liability was established under the rationale
of Goldberg:145 the deception occurred because IIT Management, as
controlling shareholder, influenced IIT, the corporation, to engage in
depends not only on how much was done in the United States but also on how much (here how
little) was done abroad." Id. at 920-21.
139. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
140. Id. at 1330-33, 1334-35.
141. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
142. Id. at 1008.
143. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
144. Id. at 987. Several courts have discussed extraterritorial application of rule lob-5. See,
ag., Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979);
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976);
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515
(8th Cir. 1973); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd with respect to holdingon
merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Seizer v. Bank of
Bermuda Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F.
Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). See generally Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial
Application of Section 10(b) of the SecuritiesandExchangeAct of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367 (1975);
Note, Offshore Mutual Funds: ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934,
13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1225 (1972); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities
ExchangeAct of1934, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 94 (1969); Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the
Ant/fraud Provisions of the Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1978); Note, American
Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. Rnv. 553 (1976); Note, Securities
Laws-SubjectMatter Jurisdictionin TransnationalSecuritiesFraud,9 N.Y.U.J. Irrr'LL. & PoL'Y
113 (1976); Note, Extra TerritorialApplication of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b.5, 34 OHIo ST. L.J.
342 (1973); Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule lob-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv.1363 (1973);
Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-The Impllcations of Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV.397
(1976); Comment, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 156 (1980); Case Comment, 7 DEN. J.INTL L. & PoL'v
279 (1977).
145. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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transactions adverse to IIT's interests without disclosing IIT Management's pecuniary interest, a fact material to the transaction. 146 Viewed
in this light, the fraudulent, domestic misrepresentations required
under the conduct test could not have occurred. Because IIT Management and the IIT fundholders were all foreign citizens, and all activities between IIT Management and IIT occurred abroad, 147 the
deception required for Goldberg liability-nondisclosure of IIT Management's pecuniary interest-necessarily occurred abroad. 4 Therefore, the Second Circuit incorrectly applied Goldberg and should not
have applied rule lOb-5.
Even if the Second Circuit's basis for applying rule lOb-5 in
Cornfeld is valid, application of the rule achieves none of the rule's
purposes. Furthermore, such application assumes an interpretation of
rule lOb-5 that exceeds the rulemaking power granted in Securities Exchange Act section 10(b). 149 Rule lOb-5 was adopted pursuant to section 10(b) as one of "the rules and regulations . . . the [SEC] may

prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."150 The Cornfeld transactions had insubstantial
effects on domestic securities markets,' 51 and thus had little or no effect
on the public interest.
Similarly, the potential lOb-5 liability created by Cornfeld does not
increase investor protection. Under Cornfeld a foreign investment adviser may be held liable for the domestic activities of an American corporation if the adviser fails to disclose its pecuniary interest in the sale
of the corporation's securities to its client. If the adviser makes the
requisite disclosure, the fiduciary relationship is preserved, but the client still is exposed to fraud arising from the domestic activities of the
American corporation. When the investment adviser also has knowledge of the corporation's fraudulent activities, Cornfeld requires disclosure of that information to protect foreign investors. Protection of
146. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917-18.

147. Pursuant to a consent agreement that resulted from a prior SEC enforcement action
against Bernard Cornfeld and Investors Overseas Services (IOS), the parent corporation of IIT,
IOS agreed not to sell shares of IIT in any area within SEC jurisdiction and also agreed to repurchase IIT shares from United States citizens then holding them. Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8083 (May 23, 1967). Regardless of the consent agreement, of the 144,496 fundholders of UT,
approximately 218 were United States residents. IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 212 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), rev'd, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). These domestic fundholders may have been servicemen'

who purchased the shares while overseas. 462 F. Supp. at 212 n.5. Both courts agreed that this
small number of domestic fundholders had little effect on the case. See id. at 223; 619 F.2d at 917.
148. IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 619 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1980).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
150. Id. § 78j(b).
151. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 917. See note 147 supra.
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foreign investors by discouraging fraudulent activities of a foreign investment adviser, however, does not fulfill the purposes of rule lOb-5
because fraud by a foreign investment adviser is a situation in which
applicable foreign laws should govern.
All pre-Cornfeld cases that apply rule l0b-5 extraterritorially seek
to protect foreign investors against fraudulent activities perpetrated by
individuals inside the United States. 152 Application of rule lOb-5 in
Cornfeld protects foreign investors of IIT against the fraudulent activities of their foreign investment adviser, IIT Management. 153 Application of the rule to the Cornfeld situation necessarily extends the rule
beyond section 10(b) by providing protection to foreign investors
against foreign, fraudulent acts. A similar extension of rule 1Ob-5 was
rejected in Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell,5 4 in
which the Second Circuit concluded that rule lOb-5 does not apply to
every transaction in which an American corporation buys or sells securities. The court should have similarly rejected the extension in
Cornfeld.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The use of rule lOb-5 to regulate offshore investment companies at
first appears logical, but, after careful analysis of the policy implications and repercussions of such use, rule lOb-5 clearly is inappropriate.
IT v. Cornfeld is an example of the intrusive regulation that results
from blind application of rule lOb-5 without the necessary policy analysis. By exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in Cornfeld, the Second
Circuit further extended the already broad scope of rule lOb-5. By applying rule lOb-5 extraterritorially to a Goldberg-type situatioii involving misleading disclosures closely related to a breach of fiduciary duty,
the court not only increased the geographical application of the rule,
but also increased the types of foreign activities covered by the rule.
The decision exposes all directors and advisers of offshore investment
companies dealing in the securities of United States corporations to potential liability under rule lOb-5.
Although the extension of rule lOb-5 sanctions to transactions involving foreign deception of domestic investors or domestic deception
of foreign investors is acceptable, the extraterritorial application of rule
lOb-5 to actions involving foreign deception of foreign investors is unacceptable. Such application of rule lOb-5 is an intrusion into the
152. See notes 139-44 supra and accompanying text.
153. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. at 223.
154. 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
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wholly foreign operations of a foreign fiduciary fulfilling its obligations
to its foreign shareholders. Congress, in the ICA and the IAA, explicitly refused to regulate those foreign fiduciary relationships. The court
has no power to extend other sections of the federal securities laws to
accomplish the exact regulation rejected by Congress. Despite this lack
of power, the Second Circuit has performed such an extension and has
created a situation it had previously sought to avoid, one in which
American securities regulations govern conduct of any party, whether
domestic or foreign, in every instance in which an American corpora155
tion buys or sells a security.
Steven L. Hearn

155. See id

